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Abstract  
 
“Handicap” is a word that has come into general use in French to designate 
impairments and disabilities. The purpose of this article is to examine the 
representations which give meaning to the notion of handicap in everyday language. 
It looks at their content and variation according to the ways in which social relations 
are organised. It is based upon ethnographic work that was carried out on how people 
labelled as “mentally handicapped” related to their neighbours in a small Brittany 
city. It uses the cultural analysis developed by Mary Douglas to analyse types of 
social construction of handicap.  
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As if they wished to assert a cultural singularity, the French continue to use the 
English word “handicap” – widely criticised and deemed to be politically incorrect 
elsewhere – to designate different disabilities of a physical, mental or social nature. 
Stiker (1999) has traced the origin of the use of this term in the area of rehabilitation 
after the First World War. As a category of Welfare State intervention, this notion 
was introduced during the post-Second World War boom period to refer to the 
problems of social regulation raised by impairments and disabilities within the 
context of national solidarity, in situations where such questions had previously been 
approached in terms of physical or mental distress within the framework of national 
solidarity; prior to that, such questions had been examined in terms of physical or 
moral distress, and related to private modalities of charity. In 2005, French 
authorities gave handicap a legal definition.  
Although political uses of the notion of handicap can be easily dated, it is far 
harder to pinpoint the emergence of the term in everyday language to designate the 
disabilities and impairments which affect certain individuals. According to H.-J. 
Stiker, “certain extremely rare uses [of the term handicap] to designate the status of 
invalids coincide [in literature on the subject] in the 1920s and 1930s, but it was not 
until the 1950s and above all the 1960s that it became truly commonplace and 
dominant, and as from 1965, invasive” (Stiker in Barral et al. 2000: 35). Common 
use of the term handicap thus developed at the same time as the reduction in 
debilitating pathologies such as poliomyelitis and the eradication of illnesses such as 
tuberculosis, which had been a public concern until the end of the 1950s. The notion 
tended to develop with the introduction of a framework for public intervention, in the 
place of notions now deemed to be incorrect or outdated, such as infirmity, idiocy, 
debility and retardation. It came into more general use with normalisation policies for 
the condition of handicapped persons and policies for integration into social life 
which led to situations of encountering normal people. It was then able to group 
together representations of impairment and disability.  
This article examines the representations of handicap which emerged from these 
encounters in everyday life. It looks at their variations and tries to explain them in 
accordance with different modes of social organisation. It therefore differs from the 
study of social representations developed by social psychologists. In the tradition of 
Moscovici’s works, this approach favours the cognitive dimension of the 
representations; it does not pay much attention to their dimension of aptitude for 
action, i.e. their implications in the organisation and unfolding of relationships. By 
looking at the relationship between representations and action, the approach 
discussed in this article takes up the analysis of collective representations developed 
by Durkheim and Mauss (1903, 1912). In their essay on primitive classifications, 
they highlighted the social origin of the classifications and of the relationships 
between groups which are at the roots of cognition. It is these social roots of 
representations that we wish to study. 
The article is based on the work of anthropologist Mary Douglas, who revived 
Durkheim’s approach through thinking about the variability of cultures by comparing 
it to the variations in forms of social organisation (Douglas, 1978, 1982, 1986; 
Thompson, Ellis & Wildavsky, 1990 ; Calvez, 2006). She developed a social-
accounting approach to culture, which she qualified as cultural analysis. She started 
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with the social frameworks which orientate the action of individuals and which 
constitute contexts of action for them. Where sociologists ordinarily compared two 
types of social organisation - Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, to use Tönnies’ 
categories (1963) – she suggested distinguishing between four categories by 
contrasting two dimensions, individuation (the organisation of social roles), which 
she called grid, and social incorporation (types of social participation), which she 
called group. Further to the two types of organisation mentioned above, which she 
respectively qualified as hierarchical and individualist, her typology identified two 
other forms of organisation, which she called egalitarian and socially subordinate. 
The first is based on membership of a group without any joint agreement on the 
respective roles of each member, unlike Gemeinschaft ; it is similar to the form of 
organisation that Schmalenbach (1975) called Bund. The second is characterised by 
the assignation of social roles without the benefit of belonging. In The weight of th 
world, Bourdieu (1999), among others, analysed the type of experience and 
possibility for action which originates in this type of organisation. To each form of 
social organisation, there are corresponding principles and values which make up 
what Durkheim calls the collective conscience and which express the prevailing 
conception of social order. For Mary Douglas, these principles and values constitute 
the framework of all cultures. Individuals use them in order to conduct themselves in 
accordance with the modalities recognised by the type of organisation within which 
they act, in order to assess how others are conducting themselves and in order to 
justify their own conduct in other people’s eyes. The use of these principles 
generates bias in the representations that individuals develop from the situations in 
which they find themselves, by linking them to the social principles in which they 
believe.  
Cultural analysis serves as a basis for an approach to handicap as a representation 
of impairment and disability. Instead of sticking to cognitive content, the objective is 
to link these representations to the manufacture of social order, i.e. to show how they 
originate in the ways in which social relationships are organised and how they help 
create these relationships. Implementation of this perspective means one must place 
oneself at a level of microsociological analysis in order to observe how, within 
everyday life encounters, people develop representations in accordance with the 
social principles to which they are attached, and how these representations orientate 
and justify relationships with handicapped people.  
In the first part of the article I will set out the area of research and explain in what 
way it is useful for this analysis. I will then give a few examples to show the extent 
to which representations of handicap vary during everyday encounters. I will show 
how these representations originate in the principles to which people refer when 
organising their relationships with others. The typology of types of social 
organisation suggested by Mary Douglas will allow an increased generality that 
shows how representations of handicap reply to issues of affirmation of a social 
nature which come about in different ways depending on the types of organisation.  
Throughout this article I will use the terms “handicap” and “mentally 
handicapped” even though I am fully aware that this is not the currently accepted 
terminology. I will use in a similar fashion the notions of “representations of 
handicap” and “handicap as representation” to stress that handicap is a category of 
classification and not a biological or psychic reality. This decision to use the notion 
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of “handicap”, strongly criticised elsewhere, originates in the desire to be closer to 
social and cultural realities in which these terms are common currency, and to bring 
out both the specificity and the approximation of the categories which are used. This 
French exoticism also allows us to say that, above and beyond the signifier, be it 
qualified as handicap or disability, it is the signifies that need to be examined, and, 
for my purposes, their roots in social life. Like Alice, we need to go through to the 
other side of the looking glass of words and get away from the image that they reflect 
of ourselves. 
 
 
The utility of Tréguier for research into handicap 
The fieldwork upon which this article is based, took place between 1988 and 1990 
in Tréguier, a small city of 2,500 inhabitants in the north of Brittany. I wanted to take 
another look at this work, because I felt it was the best suited to support the notion of 
handicap as a cultural category that I wished to develop on the basis of Mary 
Douglas’ theory (Calvez, 1993, 1994, 2001). The purpose of this section is to show 
how this fieldwork can help us to make a cultural analysis of representations of 
handicap. 
The choice of a local study in Tréguier stems from the fact that, as from 1977, 
people labelled as handicapped, and who had until then been kept in a special 
institution, began to live in the town in ordinary accommodation whilst also working 
in a sheltered workshop and benefiting from follow-up – albeit sometimes half-
hearted – from special educators. This situation was not the result of any clearly 
defined and properly implemented mainstreaming policy. It was the fruit of 
circumstances, of a lack of places in closed institutions at a time when educators 
were looking for alternatives to confinement. It gradually became one of the 
solutions for local management of mental impairment.  
This situation muddied the boundaries between the world of handicap and the 
normal world. Certain people who had until then lived in special institutions were 
taking part in ordinary life. This situation blurred both the territorial and social 
segmentations upon which representations of mental handicap had until then been 
founded. Whilst normal and abnormal related to distinct and separate places, with 
possibilities of the two meeting being restricted and controlled, the presence of the 
mentally handicapped in the heart of social life called into question the tacit 
distinctions between the handicapped and normal people, and the distance and 
avoidance which had previously prevailed. Collective representations of mental 
handicap were no longer backed by the radical separation of the special world from 
the normal world; they had to be rebuilt. A local study made it possible to see how 
normal people coped with these situations in everyday life, what principles they put 
forward to justify their conduct and what representations of handicap they developed.  
Above and beyond these immediate circumstances, Tréguier had the advantage of 
being a community in which helping the poor and the oppressed was a major part of 
the culture. This went back to the end of the 13
th
 century, when thecity, still a 
bishopric, was the home of one of the great Breton saints, Saint Yves. Patron of 
lawyers, protector of the weak and the poor, after his death he quickly became a cult 
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figure, a focal point for a tradition of hospitality and charity towards the 
impoverished. This tradition was expressed in charities of which the institutions for 
the mentally handicapped are the modern heirs. In his “Recollections of my youth”, 
Renan talks of the 1830s during which : 
“The insane were not treated with the cruelty which has since been 
imported into the conduct of asylums. So far from being sequestered, they 
were allowed to wander about all the day long. There is as a rule a good deal 
of insanity at Treguier. […] These harmless lunatics, whose insanity differed 
very much in degree, were looked upon as part and parcel of the town, and 
people spoke about our “lunatics” just as at Venice people said “nostre 
carampane” (Renan, 1897).  
Despite the obvious discontinuities between the hospital tradition of the Ancien 
Régime and modern care for the mentally handicapped, Tréguier nevertheless offers 
the advantage of having a cultural framework of reference which can make sense of 
and justify the normal life of certain mentally handicapped people. This is expressed 
in a joint opinion which echoes Renan’s recollections:  
“It’s better for the handicapped to be in town than to be locked up. They 
are kind, they don’t make any noise. They are like everyone else. When they 
can get by on their own, there’s no need to lock them up. They can learn and 
live like everyone else.”  
This opinion is supported by a duty to be charitable which old people express with 
regard to the beggars and retarded people who lived locally. Talking to me about one 
such person that she remembered from her childhood, Renan’s great niece said:  
“He was basically a handicapped person […]. He lived off charity; but 
you see, we felt it was normal to give to such people.” 
As with every community account, the cultural account of the duty to be 
charitable is sufficiently flexible to allow its members to refer to it in accordance 
with each individual’s guiding principles. It is used in a different manner by normal 
people to make sense of encounters with those who used to live in special 
institutions, depending on the conceptions of social order that they defend. The 
representations of handicap that result from situations of encounter thus show 
variations which can be related to these principles of organisation.  
Moving from a cultural account, which expresses the overall consensus of a 
community, to variations of representations, requires not considering the local 
community as a whole, but as a combination of relational contexts set in time and 
space. The fieldwork focused essentially on the relational contexts constituted by 
relationships between neighbours. When people share the same space, they have 
opportunities to meet which bring into play various types of interaction (cooperation, 
conflict, avoidance, ignorance). In what they say, in what they do together, in what 
they ask of one another, they implicitly rely upon social rules and principles that 
allow them to justify these rules. They thus call upon relationship models that 
mobilise the conception of social order to which they adhere.  
Ordinarily, the routine of relationships allows them to have dealings with one 
another without worrying about the rules governing their encounters, something that 
Berger and Luckman (1966) qualify as non-problematic sectors of social life. Certain 
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situations cause problems because they are unusual or unexpected, falling outside 
routine. They require an objectivation of the principles upon which individuals 
organised and justified their relationships with others. Some interactions between 
handicapped people and normal people in the neighbourhood pertain to these 
problematic sectors of social life, in as much as, given their respective histories, they 
have different expectations regarding how the interactions would occur. Yet the 
relationship is not symmetrical, as normal people refer to an established mode of life 
to formulate and justify their demands of people who come from the special 
institution. This mobilisation of social principles with which to organise 
neighbourhood relationships with the former inmates is the central object of the 
study.  
 
A climate of benevolence and a marking of difference 
The presence in Tréguier of former inmates in a special institution was not 
insignificant. Quantitatively, it meant that there were fifty or so people living in 
houses or flats located in two parts of the tcity. Daily routine meant that the sheltered 
workshop where they were employed closed at 17:00; so they would be seen arriving 
as a group at the square in the citycentre. They were identified and qualified as a 
category of persons whose specificity came from their institutional affiliation, as the 
following extracts from interviews show:  
“I know them by sight, because even if I’m not looking to get to know 
people, I know who they are. […] They are people who have a slight mental 
handicap. Their handicap doesn’t stop them from living in a town, doesn’t 
mean they have to live in an institution. […] I can spot who they are, it’s 
possible, even if it’s subjective, there’s something visible. To do with body 
attitude, you can tell.”  
“You can tell from the way they dress, their faces too, the way they talk, you 
can tell as soon as you see them.”  
“They are not really ill. You can see that they are not really like other 
people. They don’t have serious problems. But you can tell when you see them. 
The way they walk, you can tell a bit, and their faces.” 
Normal people associate the former inmates with the special institution. The 
representations of handicap that they develop are founded in the situation that this 
institution had created. The fact of living in town is associated with a slight mental 
handicap, a capacity to be autonomous, an absence of danger for other people. This 
therefore leads to a series of joint representations which allow ordinary people to 
associate mental handicap with the presence of the former inmates in town, without 
having to call the normal order of things into question. The boundary between 
normal and abnormal moves in accordance with the choices of the special institution. 
People suppose that the mentally handicapped who are the “most seriously ill” or the 
“most dangerous” remain confined. They build up a representation of former inmates 
as people who are different, as demonstrated by their former status, but not 
dangerous – unlike those who remain confined.  
These representations, which focus on institutional marking, are based on a 
distance from a group of people associated with the special institution. This general 
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marking of the statutory difference is found in occasional interactions. The 
representations are therefore approximate, or even contradictory, reflecting the 
difficulty of combining the label of handicap given to the former inmates with their 
presence in a normal milieu.  
“You can tell from their faces, their eyes, something. It’s hard to say, but I’d 
know from their faces. Two from here came to see me, and I was amazed by the 
conversation they were able to have, the way they spoke, calm and clear.”  
“They’ve been well accepted. […] They have the right to live [in town] if 
they’re not a danger to other people. They need to do their shopping, have a 
coffee. But I don’t know if they are aware of it. Even if they know that they are 
handicapped, they don’t know that we know. If it’s a mental handicap, I don’t 
think they know they are handicapped. As far as they are concerned, they are 
normal; they are in their own little world.”  
What marks their difference and justifies maintaining contact with the special 
institution, is the absence of reflexive conscience, which means they do not know 
what the reciprocity of exchange is, nor what it means to meet the obligations of a 
social life. So they can live in town, but because they are unable to give a sense to 
their conduct, they cannot have any social exchange other than that relating to the 
routines of everyday life.  
The interviews, carried out locally, thus reveal representations of handicap 
structured around the marking of a difference. They are based upon the situation 
created by the moving of the boundary between the normal world and the world of 
handicap. They make up for a lack of significations by calling upon accounts relating 
to the representation of confinement, idiocy, the effects of alcoholism, which 
developed throughout history, and by adapting these accounts to the situation created 
by the fact that former inmates were living in town.  
These representations nevertheless depend upon the conditions of the study in 
which they are made. By asking people about “the handicapped”, taken as a specific 
group in the town, the researcher introduces a specific category which immediately 
marks the difference and which orientates what people say. He/she hears general 
accounts which portray an average state of the beliefs and representations relating to 
handicap, but which say nothing about the effective development of the relationships 
and the significations they are given.  
 
 
The representations of handicap in the neighbourhood 
In order to get to the other side of the general representations of handicap and 
access the categories that people use to regulate their relationships in everyday life, I 
examined the relationships within the neighbourhood. I asked myself how people act 
during encounters and exchanges with people who they otherwise consider to be 
different, and how they explain and justify their actions. This objective involves 
carrying out fieldwork which is based on a common condition, in this case the fact of 
being neighbours who share the same space, and which looks at the categories of 
neighbourhood that people develop and at the reasons they give for these categories. 
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These representations, once they have been established by the fieldwork, can be 
compared with the institutional career of the people in order to see how these 
categories mutually feed or reject each other. This process of working on all of the 
neighbourhood relationships is unwieldy, especially as it was used in three parts of 
the town and the surrounding area. Its main advantage is that it avoids the pitfall of a 
disembodied approach to representations, positioning itself instead at the level of the 
connections between what people say and what they do.  
During the field interviews, the relationships between the handicapped and the 
normal people seemed to be a major concern, but not necessarily in the way that we 
expected. For example, an elderly lady complained about her neighbours who were 
making noise late at night, and said she thought this was because “they were 
mentally handicapped”. When we checked, her neighbour was in fact a educator 
who worked in the special institution. This is an interesting anecdote, because this 
lady, who had little contact with other people, was using a common representation of 
handicapped people to justify her criticism of people she knew nothing about. During 
interviews on a housing estate, someone known to be a former inmate was accused of 
unseemly behaviour with regard to a 10-year-old girl. These accusations, which 
mobilised a representation linking handicap with sexual danger, were called into 
question by other people on the housing estate and were denied by the parents of the 
girl in question, who stressed the beneficial aspect of the former inmates living in 
town. In this case the presence of a handicapped person is caught up in the issues of 
how the neighbourhood relationships are defined and organised ; it is important to 
consider the representations of handicap in terms of these issues. Elsewhere, in a 
rural hamlet where I knew former inmates to be living, their identification with the 
world of handicap was non-existent. In a context where the habitation was spread out 
and where frequent encounters were not obligatory, this was explained by the ability 
of the former inmates to fit into an established role, that of a discreet young couple 
working in town and taking care of their garden. Without forgetting these routine 
situations, the research mainly focused on problematic relationships, for this is where 
the people involved call, more or less implicitly, upon conceptions of social order 
and of the relationships which should result. This is where they mobilise 
representations of handicap to orientate the demands they make of former inmates, to 
justify their opinions and their actions.  
I will give a few contrasting examples to show the way in which representations 
of handicap emerge from neighbourhood relationships. The first concerns a 
shopkeeper, who has since died, who was the first to lodge inmates in rooms that she 
rented above her shop. When she was contacted by an educator to lodge a 
handicapped couple, her concerns were for the damage that they might do, especially 
damage by fire because it was an old wooden building and the inhabitants were 
worried about fire more than anything else. Her concerns evaporated when the 
therapist guaranteed that the couple would be monitored. As she held a central role in 
the neighbourhood network, her acceptance encouraged others to agree to this type of 
lodging. 
“I gave preference to the handicapped. Sometimes they made some noise 
or caused some damage, but they always paid for it. I had nothing to 
complain about. When one of them left, [the educators] came to tell me. They 
always paid their rent. […] They are nice honest people. No-one ever stole 
 9 
anything. There was one woman, she tore the wallpaper; I had no reason to 
complain because I was reimbursed. When another woman left, they paid the 
remaining two weeks of rent. […] Hélène, the one who tore the wallpaper, 
she was nice. She left because she liked a change every now and then. But she 
remained on good terms with us. She must have been angry when she tore the 
wallpaper. […] There are people who stress their differences from the 
handicapped. But they are human beings like the rest of us. We like to help. 
They were nice to us, we were nice to them.”  
Whilst the conducts mentioned by this shopkeeper might serve as justification for 
criticism, or as justification for their difference, they are interpreted in a benevolent 
manner. It is the honesty of the former inmates that is stressed, in contrast to the 
common judgement of others. This representation is based on the guarantee provided 
by the special institution, but it also mobilises a conception of social relationships in 
which there is a duty to be charitable to those in need. It is because the handicapped 
are considered to be in a situation of need that the shopkeeper goes beyond the 
obligations of renting, that she excuses the atypical conduct and that she describes 
her charitable action as being part of what she feels to be the normal order of 
relationships.  
This response can be contrasted with that which is used by estate agents in the 
rental business, who consider former inmates in terms of the categories expected 
within their business activity:  propriety and personal responsibility. A general 
principle is affirmed :  
“I think they should be accepted as long as they behave properly. […] By 
behaving properly, I mean that I don’t hear of any problems, no noise, that 
everything goes smoothly, that they are clean and tidy.”  
These principles are put to the test in the concrete modalities of flat rental. When 
atypical conduct occurred it was felt that a reminder of the rules would reduce or 
eliminate the problem.  
“One day, François was cleaning his vacuum cleaner by emptying it out of 
the window. Another time there was a flowerpot which fell into the street. 
Two weeks later the earth still hadn’t been cleaned up. I told him:  
“François, you haven’t cleared it up”, he said:  “It wasn’t me” and I said:  
“But come on, you’re the only one with flowerpots.” […] When they arrived 
in the flat they used to put their rubbish bins in the corridor, where they 
stayed for two weeks. When they were full, they put them in the loft. But that 
was just at the start, they didn’t know when the bins had to be emptied.”  
The incidents which occur are interpreted through the looking glass of the 
experience in a special institution, and are seen as peculiar behaviour which can be 
corrected by learning rules and following recommendations. They are minimised, or 
even excused, as long as they remain within the bounds of acceptable conduct and as 
long as they do not have an adverse effect on the rental activity. For example, if a fire 
is started, this would lead to the expulsion of the tenant and the owner’s refusal to 
ever rent to former inmates again. It is not the benevolence or the duty to be 
charitable that are called into question, but the limits within which they can be 
exercised.  
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The fact of having a professional activity guides the representations of the former 
inmates. The very same estate agent thus assesses people in terms of the time she has 
available. 
“I think they are people who require a great deal of time and attention. 
One of them comes here every evening to talk about music. I told my 
colleague to beware of him, and I told him “okay, if you want, but outside of 
office opening times.”  Because otherwise he’d stay for hours. […] But they 
are people who are very sensitive; you can tell that they are sensitive because 
they sulk very easily.” 
In this case, the way in which relationships develop depends on interpersonal 
adjustments. 
In a recently completed council housing estate, on which there are former inmates 
as well as families with low incomes or with socio-economic difficulties, the 
representations are just as contrasted. The oldest adults put forward a representation 
of former inmates as children in adults’ bodies.  
“Handicapped people are big kids. Sometimes they have to be told off like 
children. […] They laugh or sing for no reason, they talk to themselves. It’s 
natural. That’s what it is to be a child. They are adults and children at the 
same time. They have no complexes. […] People don’t realise that they are 
children, well, not really children, but a child’s brain in an adult’s body.”  
This adult viewpoint generates real concerns about the capacity of former inmates 
to look after themselves. The lack of confidence is maintained through the friction 
between their representation as children and the autonomous life conditions in which 
they find themselves. It feeds perceptions of unpredictable behaviours that the 
familiarity from living in close proximity cannot totally remove.  
“When they are around, there are days when I can’t relax. We’re afraid of 
a fire, you can never be sure. The other day we smelled gas coming from the 
young man’s flat downstairs. I asked him if he’d turned the gas off properly. 
[…] In fact, there’s some of them I wouldn’t trust. One day one of them asked 
me to come round. When I arrived she had locked the door.”  
“It’s true that at first I was scared when I arrived on the estate, I didn’t 
know what they were going to do. […] One of them, when she bought a 
motorbike, she came round to show it to me, and her little cat too, she told me 
a bit about herself. They need to see people other than people like themselves. 
She’s a bit like a little girl.”  
 
Those who consider former inmates to be children think it is normal that the 
educators look after them. But other people just see them as privileged people who 
are better off than they are. This contrast in representations was very clear on the 
estate where a few former inmates had been given flats. It related relatively narrowly 
to differences in lifestyles and trajectories, between established couples with teenage 
children, and younger couples with younger children, and who, in this region 
suffering from unemployment, had real problems finding jobs.  
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“Handicapped people don’t make any effort to be accepted. They shut 
themselves away among themselves, spend too much time together, it’s not 
good for them, they can’t become part of the community. It would be good if 
they could, but they receive too much help. […] They’ve got [TV] channels 5 
and 6. They have someone to come and do their gardens, their lawns are 
mown and kept tidy. It’s not normal. I think they are capable of tidying up 
themselves. [...] At first we thought it was a good thing. But it’s over the top. 
It doesn’t bother us, we’re just thinking of them.”  
“They are people who need to be with people like themselves; it’s like with 
people of a different race. […] They like to stay together, but they are well 
accepted […]. They need to be able to live like other people, do their 
housework, that will help them. I’m not criticising, it’s good that they live 
with us, it’s not their fault.”  
The process for comparing the respective disadvantages highlights the supposedly 
best life conditions for the former inmates, who continue to get support from the 
special institution. The principle of positive benevolence with regard to the 
handicapped is linked to the affirmation of an insurmountable difference from the 
normal human condition. The alterity which is built in a situation contains the 
beginnings of logics of exclusion, similar to those analysed by Elias and Scotson 
(1994). All that is needed is an incident, real or supposed, for the neighbours’ 
demands for exclusion to be formulated, as was the case for the above-mentioned 
accusation of indecent behaviour. Accusations of danger (“You don’t know what’s 
going on in their heads”) and of depravation (“They have strange parties, they do 
strange things together”) thus find favourable ground, not only to be expressed, but 
more importantly to be deemed credible.  
Encounters with the former inmates led normal people to select and consider 
various arguments to make sense of situations that differ from the routines and 
expectations of relationships in everyday life. Within a given cultural account of 
benevolence towards handicapped people, the representations of handicap see major 
variations which originate in the principles that normal people mobilise to organise 
and make sense of such relationships. In my opinion, it is not particularly useful to 
know whether these representations exist in a latent state in the local cultural 
repertory, because what requires the researcher’s attention is their mobilisation to 
organise the relationships and the conditions which make them credible in the eyes of 
the population. It is through these exchanges that they become accessible to 
sociological analysis.  
 
The diversity of representations and neighbourhood contexts 
In order to give a sociological meaning to this diversity of representations, we 
need to relate them to the principles that people mobilise to organise their 
neighbourhood relationships. The neighbourhood can be analysed as a collective 
reality in terms of the two dimensions in accordance with which cultural analysis 
characterises social contexts, i.e. group or the modalities of affiliation and grid or the 
organisation of social roles. These dimensions generate constraints which can be 
used to consider handicap as representation. 
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In a neighbourhood in which affiliation requires the participation of individuals in 
a group that is defined by collective rules which restrict individual significance, 
disabilities can be accepted as long as they do not call the group into question, and as 
long as the group accepts them as a collective heritage. This is why the explanations 
of disabilities are determining factors, because they define collective responsibilities 
towards individuals. In Tréguier, lay nosography makes the distinction between 
major impairments and slight impairments. The former are caused by the parents 
being alcoholic; they are an attribute of very poor people ; social opinion leads to the 
impaired being locked up and to collective responsibility being given over to 
specialists. Slight impairments are randomly explained; they are an attribute of 
respectable families in thecity. Having no reason to use these impairments to blame 
families, the group can be compassionate towards them. The fact that they live in a 
normal milieu, and even that they can be living as a couple, is therefore given a 
positive spin as an apprenticeship of social life and as an opportunity to improve 
their situation. Yet by referring to convictions concerning the hereditary transmission 
of defects, the possibility of procreation among the former inmates living in the town 
is criticised, as it calls into question the notion of a random origin of impairments.  
The difference between a neighbourhood group which bases itself on 
differentiated statuses and a group which believes in equal condition, is the existence 
of categories allowing one to take into account a range of individual behaviours. In 
an egalitarian neighbourhood, as long as an individual participates in the group to the 
same extent as the others, and meets the requirements that the others express, he/she 
is perceived to be the same as the other members of the group with regard to identity 
of condition. As soon as a difference in behaviour or an incompetence becomes 
explicit, it is put down to the person having been an inmate. If this difference 
expresses something that the group has experienced, such as domination by people 
more powerful, the group might feel sorry for the individual, seeing him/her as a 
victim. On the other hand, if the person’s incompetence is seen as a threat to the 
group, he/she may be deemed to be at fault - bad or dangerous – and be partially or 
totally rejected. This institution of former inmate as scapegoat allows us to bring 
together individuals who are unable to stabilise their relationships. Other people can 
also be placed in this situation of scapegoat; this was the case of a single person who 
was an alcoholic, who was accused of having AIDS at the time when we were just 
beginning to learn about the illness and when it was locally believed to be 
contagious. The libel of which these people were the victims must be plausible in the 
group’s eyes; the reference to handicap and its association with uncertainties 
regarding behaviour or sexual dangers thus becomes essential in order to justify this 
exclusion.  
In a neighbourhood group characterised by different hierarchical statuses – for 
example, based on age and social rank – the existence of several classes of 
individuals allows one to allocate a status to former inmates as long as an analogy or 
equivalence is recognised between these persons and one of the existing classes. In 
the heritage of traditions associated with Saint Yves, handicapped people can be 
compared to children or to the poor, towards whom there is a duty to protect and to 
be charitable. There is thus a frame of reference with which to relate former inmates 
to a generational or social stratification. In the case of stratification by age, the 
equivalences are fragile, as can be seen in the representations of former inmates (“a 
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child’s brain in an adult’s body”), as they generate hybrid categories, whereas 
analogies with the poor and the destitute create fewer problems of category 
coherency and plausibility. It is mainly through asymmetrical relationships that these 
places are allocated to former inmates. In this way they do not have to satisfy the 
obligations of exchange and reciprocity which prevail among equals. Their 
neighbours give them many things and exercise discreet control over them; in return, 
they expect the former inmates to keep to the places they have been given. They are 
then considered to have merit, due to or despite their handicap. Their sometimes 
inappropriate behaviour can be tolerated as lapses and they can be excused because 
they have no education. Neighbourhood relationships tend to maintain the pecking 
order that they impose.  
Just like in a business relationship, in a neighbourhood which promotes individual 
interest, the impairment or incompetence denoted by the status of handicap are not 
tolerated, because they defy the principle of autonomy and self-achievement. This is 
expressed in social pressures to ensure that former inmates are monitored by 
specialists and that they have limited access to the normal world so that their 
presence does not interfere with normal relationships. They can rent flats in town as 
long as they are monitored by educators who ensure that they are doing no damage, 
that they are not disturbing the neighbours, and that the rent is paid on time. These 
prerequisites for good behaviour are also applied to normal tenants; unlike the latter, 
the former inmates are immediately considered to be unable to fulfil them. In 
relationships based on individual interest, the former inmates thus take on the status 
of “dominated”, which is justified by their history in a special institution. Aside from 
monetary exchange, this position leads to limited communication and to 
condescending attitudes which mark a radical difference. This situation of 
domination is justified by their inability to act in an autonomous manner in 
accordance with the existing rules.  
In a neighbourhood marked by isolation and social subordination, responses are 
changeable. Commiseration with regard to former inmates marked by a difficult life 
and misfortune, might be followed by criticisms of the social privileges that they are 
granted. Individuals who act in this context have no particular stakes to defend and 
tend to compare their situations with those of other people in situations of need. The 
criticism of others allows them to formulate demands for aid and concern which they 
would not otherwise be able to express. Relationships in everyday life lead to 
behaviour somewhere between defiance, jealousy and compassion. The demands 
made ofthe former inmates do not set them a stable horizon from which they can 
rientate their action. When several people are sharing the same condition of 
subordination, they can make a former inmate the scapegoat for their unfortunate 
condition. As long as they remain isolated, their recriminations have no 
consequences beyond personal interactions.  
The responses provided by the different contexts of neighbourhood lead to an 
allocation of social places and status specific to the people labelled as former inmates 
of special institutions. An individualist neighbourhood gives them a partial status. 
They are classified in accordance with their capacity to contribute to economic and 
social exchanges. This status goes along with demands of control of aspects of their 
lifes which cannot be regulated by ordinary exchanges (e.g. sexuality, leisure, etc.). 
A neighbourhood with a hierarchy of statuses gives them a status which is based 
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upon the analogy between the classifications of impairment and the recognised 
statutory categories. This allocation of a minor or dominated status is accompanied 
by an asymmetry between their rights and their duties in relation to the group. In an 
egalitarian neighbourhood, the allocated status is ambivalent. When similarity of 
condition is taken into account, there is an expectation that the same status will be 
shared. When this expectation is not satisfied, there is rejection outside the group. 
When behaviour which is not in keeping with the group is perceived as a threat, the 
rest of the group wants the former inmates to be controlled by the institution with 
which they are once again identified. In a neighbourhood of subordination, the 
rejection is atomised. In both cases the former inmate personifies adversity. His/her 
presence in the normal world generates uncertainties that the principles at the root of 
the relationships cannot contain.  
These responses, very different from one another, do not provide the former 
inmates with a stable and explicit framework of reference that they can use as a basis 
from which to act in the normal world. Furthermore, their socialisation in a special 
institution did not give them the cultural resources that would have allowed them to 
process the contradictory demands that would be made of them in everyday 
relationships. The most reasonable solution available to them is to reduce their life 
outside the institution to well-controlled routines, and to withdraw from areas of 
social life that they are incapable of controlling. The withdrawal which is an adapted 
response to the various demands that they are unable to meet then becomes, in the 
eyes of normal people, a mark of their incompetence and a reminder of their former 
status of inmate.  
 
 
An empirical paradigm for the construction of handicap 
By taking into consideration the multiple practices that a more incorporated level 
of social life does not allow one to perceive, local analysis allows one to unfold the 
process of building handicap as a representation of disabilities and impairments. 
Above and beyond its singular contribution, this ethnography can be used to build an 
analysis of a more general scope, which makes it an empirical paradigm in the sense 
of Elias :  
“On a small scale, we can build an explanatory model for the 
configuration that we believe to be universal :  a model ready to be tested, 
extended and, where needed, revised in the light of other studies relating to 
representations on a larger scale. In this sense, the resulting model can serve 
as an “empirical paradigm”. By using it to assess more complex 
representations, we gain a better idea of the structural characteristics that 
they have in common and the reasons for which, in other conditions, they 
function and develop along different lines” (Elias & Scotson, 1994: 45)  
The study of neighbourhoods has allowed us to link representations of handicap 
with forms of social organisation, by showing in what way these representations help 
develop social order. The following table summarises the principles behind these 
representations, in accordance with three main dimensions:  
(1) The social perception of impairment,  
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(2) Taking impairment into account in the relational context, 
(3) The characteristics of the status accorded to the former inmates. 
 
Table : The social principles behind representations of handicap 
 
Grid : Organisation of social roles 
Ascribed 
role 
B- Social subordination 
1. Impairment is seen as a 
person’s attribute, and a matter 
for commiseration or jealousy. 
2. Assessment in terms of the 
comparative advantages it 
confers. 
3. Recognition of an identity of 
individual condition or 
statutory degradation.  
C- Community hierarchy 
1. Impairment is considered in 
relation to existing statuses. It is 
taken into account if it does not 
call the group into question and if 
it can be related to a recognised 
status. 
2. Collective responsibility 
regarding impairments which are 
related to the group. 
3. Attribution of a status and 
definition of rights and duties 
relating to that status. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Achieved 
role 
A- Individualist 
1. Impairment is defined as an 
unequal capacity which might 
threaten inter-individual 
transactions. 
2. Treated as a partial 
incompetence. 
3. In the case of a perturbation of 
the social status quo, demands 
for professionals to exercise 
control. 
D- Egalitarian 
1. Impairment is an attack on 
iequality within the group. It can be a 
cause of collective mobilisation. 
2. Demand for participation 
identical to that of the other group 
members. 
3. People accepted on an egalitarian 
basis or rejected as a threat to the 
group if they do not meet 
requirements.  
 
 Individual Group 
 Group: Modes of social participation 
 
 
What cultural analysis does, is to distinguish between four typical modalities of 
constructing handicap and to relate them to different ways of organising social 
relationships. Far from being a mere static typology, this model allows us to explain 
the changes in the representations and practices relating to handicap as movements 
on the diagram which originate in transformations in social contexts within which 
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individuals and groups act, or within their cultural frameworks. These 
transformations are subject to constraints that stem from the social structure and from 
the opportunities they give to individuals to change. They depend on constraints 
rooted in culture and in its flexibility to integrate new categories and situations. They 
are also subject to internal constraints:  the move from a hierarchical conception to 
an individualist conception of handicap therefore supposes an unstable, egalitarian or 
isolated stage. This model therefore has a heuristic potential to explain 
transformations in relationships to impairment and disability.  
It therefore seems to me that the model built within the context of cultural analysis 
on the basis of an ethnography of neighbourhood relationships, enables a rise in 
generality to explain the reasoning that governs social relationships with impairment 
and its expression in categories such as handicap and disability. More than a simple 
theory, cultural analysis is a sociological method, to take Durkheim’s meaning 
(1982), which allows us to link social debates to the issues of building social order. 
The model enables us to group and converge apparently opposite or contradictory 
analyses of responses to disabilities by examining the type of social order to which 
they refer, i.e. by putting research into its social context and into the constraints and 
opportunities that it creates.  
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